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Abstract
A semi-fragile watermarking scheme for multiple band
images is presented. We propose to embed a mark into
remote sensing images applying a tree structured vector
quantization approach to the pixel signatures, instead of
processing each band separately. The signature of the
multispectral or hyperspectral image is used to embed the
mark in it order to detect any significant modification of
the original image. The image is segmented into three-
dimensional blocks and a tree structured vector quantizer
is built for each block. These trees are manipulated using
an iterative algorithm until the resulting block satisfies a
required criterion which establishes the embedded mark.
The method is shown to be able to preserve the mark un-
der lossy compression (above a given threshold) but, at
the same time, it detects possibly forged blocks and their
position in the whole image.
Keywords: Hyperspectral images, Semi-fragile water-
marking, Forensics, Image authentication, Tampering de-
tection.
1 Introduction
Remote Sensing images have gained increased attention
by the research community in recent years, since new uses
and applications of this area are often reported. Looking
for water in remote planets (NASA missions), water pol-
lution control, high precision farming or natural resources
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management, among others, are well-known uses of these
images (Atkinson and Tate, 1999; Wong and Lao, 2003).
The acquisition of remote sensing images involves expen-
sive equipment like aircraft or satellites. Therefore their
economic value must be preserved when a third party pays
for them.
New techniques for representation, storage and distri-
bution of digital multimedia information have been devel-
oped in the recent years. Formats like MP3 or JPEG2000,
and P2P networks for file sharing, increase the distribu-
tion of all kind of files. This situation has raised the prob-
lem of managing authorized and unauthorized copying,
illegal distribution through the Internet and manipulation
of digital information. To prevent illegal copies and the
alteration of digital files (audio or image), some methods
and techniques have been developed to embed a water-
mark into the digital files. This watermark must be imper-
ceptible and can used to determine the integrity of the dig-
ital files. In this authentication process, two different ap-
proaches, namely semi-fragile watermarking and robust
watermarking, can be used.
Both fragile and semi-fragile watermarking schemes
can be used for tampering detection and localization. In
fragile schemes, all modifications are detected as tamper-
ing. Therefore any kind of lossy compression or filters can
not be applied to the marked image without removing the
embedded mark. On the other hand, semi-fragile schemes
allow some degree of compression and small modifica-
tions of the marked images. This allows, for example, to
create a compressed version of the image which can be
distributed electronically (possibly with a reduced price)
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but maintaining the original watermark. Hence, semi-
fragile watermarking makes unnecessary the marking of
different versions of the same image independently and,
thus, reduces the cost required to distribute different ver-
sions of the same image with different degrees of qual-
ity. If the client has access to a compressed version of
the image, he or she may check the integrity of the im-
age (discarding tampering). After that, he or she may be
interested in getting access to the original uncompressed
image at a higher price. For example, the schemes (Yeung
and Mintzer, 1997; Fridrich, 2002) embed a watermark
into an image in such a way that the embedded informa-
tion is destroyed or modified if the image is tampered. It
is modified or destroyed when the marked image is ma-
nipulated.
Robust watermarking methods are those for which the
mark is detected after strong alterations. These meth-
ods are not used for tampering detection or localization.
Robust watermarking allows different types of manipula-
tions, including compression, filtering or geometrical dis-
tortions. Usually, robustness requires reducing the trans-
parency of the embedded mark, i.e. the marked file is sig-
nificantly distorted. In this case, a trade-off between ro-
bustness and perceptual quality must be achieved. Robust
watermarking schemes have proven successful in order to
protect images in several ways, such as resolving author-
ing disputes or detecting changes in the images aimed to
produce a forged copy, as shown in (Lin et al., 2000; Min-
guillo´n et al., 2003).
In remote sensing imaging applications, the most useful
schemes aimed to detect changes in the image are semi-
fragile watermarking systems. Semi-fragile schemes are
able to overcome some minor modifications, as those pro-
duced by near-lossless compression, but reveal the exis-
tence of manipulations (also referred to as “attacks” in
the watermarking literature), such as copy-and-replace,
or excessive information removal by means of cropping
or lossy compression. Most existing semi-fragile water-
marking applications can be applied on monochromatic
images, and thus, can be easily extended to multispectral
or hyperspectral images (remote sensing images) by pro-
cessing the multiple bands of these images independently.
It is worth pointing out the difference between water-
marking and hashing schemes. The watermarking process
alters the original data file by modifying the content in or-
der to embed the mark. Most schemes require a common
(secret) key both at the embedder at the detector which
is usually introduced to endorse the system with security
features. The detection process only needs the (secret)
key to determine whether the image has been altered and
where. With a blind detection method, no further infor-
mation is needed to detect the mark (i.e. the original un-
marked content is not required). On the other hand, hash-
ing methods generate a given number (e.g. a checksum)
which is needed in the detection process. If tamper lo-
calization is required, the hashing values of different ar-
eas of the image must be generated and checked at the
receiver side. Hence, the detector needs all the hashing
values related to the original image. In addition, if multi-
ple versions of the image are created (e.g. with different
compression ratios) multiple hashing values would be re-
quired (a set of values for each different version). Con-
sequently, the semi-fragile watermarking approach makes
it possible to protect the content of different versions of a
hyperspectral image using a single procedure. Further-
more, the watermarking scheme can be used even for
different hyperspectral images with the same embedding
key. This is not possible with hashing techniques, which
require the computation of a different set of hashing val-
ues for each different version of each image.
There are previous works dealing with satellite image
watermarking (Qin et al., 2004; Ho et al., 2005; Wang
et al., 2005; Caldelli et al., 2006; Sal and Gran˜a, 2008).
Ho et al. (2005) use a satellite image and decompose it
into two mutually orthogonal sub-fields, but only uses one
band of the satellite image and only one field for water-
marking purposes. Qin et al. (2004) present a semi-fragile
watermarking scheme based on wavelet transforms. The
edge and texture of the remote sensing image are ex-
tracted and the watermark is embedded only in the edge
character. In this case, once again, only one band is
marked. Caldelli et al. (2006) present a scheme to em-
bed an authentication mark using the method described
by Fridrich (2002) to mark and compress the image at the
same time. This scheme uses only one band to embed
the mark into each block to detect manipulations. Wang
et al. (2005) present a watermarking scheme to preserve a
digital content, but only uses one band of the hyperspec-
tral image of the Indian Remote Sensing System. Finally,
Sal and Gran˜a (2008) describe an evolutionary algorithm
which marks an image based on the manipulation of the
discrete cosine transform (DCT) computed for each band
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of the image. Tamhankar et al. (2003) describe a method
to embed one mark into the hyperspectral image using
the whole signature, but it does not allow compression
of the hyperspectral image. This adaptive watermarking
method based on the redundant discrete wavelet transform
(RDWT) is a fragile scheme.
In this paper, a semi-fragile watermarking scheme
specifically developed for remote sensing images is pre-
sented. This method works with all the bands at the same
time and provides uniform protection for multispectral
and hyperspectral imaging applications. The method can
be tuned to embed the mark according to band relevance,
depending on the content and the signatures (also known
as the spectral reflectance curve) to be protected.
Usually, fragile or semi-fragile watermarking schemes
of multiple band images also consider only one band or
process each band separately (Ekici et al., 2004; Caldelli
et al., 2006). It is possible to work with images using
only one band for computing where and how to embed the
watermark, but then, when multiband images are marked
with the same method, the bands are usually marked sep-
arately or only one band or a subset of bands are marked.
Note that, if the bands are marked separately, the changes
in the signature curves can be uneven (some values can
be increased and others decreased, for the same pixel).
Hence, the shapes of the signatures may vary, which may
lead to a misclassification of the image (for example, a
different material could be identified in the image). Be-
cause of this, a method which preserves the shapes of the
signatures is highly demanded, and this can be achieved
by working with the signatures as a whole.
The method suggested in this paper uses the hyper-
spectral image as a whole applying a vector quantization
approach. The image is segmented in three-dimensional
blocks of a given size which determines the spatial res-
olution of the embedding and detection algorithm. For
each block, a tree with an endmember (real values read
by the sensor for each pixel region) of the remote sens-
ing image is built and these endmembers are manipulated
by removing the least significant bits in order to increase
the robustness against possible near-lossless compression
attacks. Finally, the block is manipulated using an itera-
tive algorithm until the resulting block (TSVQ tree) sat-
isfies some criterion. The image is modified according to
a secret key which produces a different criterion for each
block in order to avoid copy-and-replace attacks. This
key determines the internal structure of the tree and also
the resulting distortion.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the
coding of remote sensing images by means of tree struc-
tured vector quantization is reviewed. In Section 3, the
watermarking strategy and the mark embedding and mark
retrieval processes are described. Section 4 presents the
results obtained with the suggested scheme for the chosen
experimental corpus, and analyses the basic parameters
that determine the results. Finally, the most relevant con-
clusions of this work are drawn in Section 5.
2 Background
In this section, an overview of three basic concepts used in
the method presented in this paper, namely remote sens-
ing images, lossy compression and vector quantization,
are briefly introduced.
2.1 Remote sensing images
Remote sensing images store information about a broad
area of the surface of the Earth. The construction scheme
of this information is shown in Figure 1.
Each pixel is represented by a signature, which is a set
of values obtained for different frequencies of the light
spectrum (bands). The signature of each pixel of the re-
mote sensing image is related to the different materials
which can be found in that area, such as water, forest or
minerals. Figure 2 shows the different signatures for a
light reflectance for clear lake water, turbid river water,
vegetation, dry soil and wet soil, as presented in Smith
(2006).
One of the most relevant problems to handle these im-
ages is their huge size. A typical hyperspectral image
covering a small region of a few kilometres contains mil-
lions of pixels, and each pixel is represented by sev-
eral bands, depending on the sensor type. As an exam-
ple, the Airbone Visible / Infrared Imaging Spectrometer
(AVIRIS) (NASA, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 2004) im-
ages contain 224 bands and, usually, 16 bits are used for
the values in each band. Images with lower resolution are
often referred to as “multispectral”. This is the case for
Landsat images (NASA, U.S. Geological Survey, 1972),
which use 8 bands for each pixel and 8 bits for the values
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of each band. The number of bands in a remote sensing
image determines their name, that is, multi, hyper or ul-
traspectral.
One of the techniques to reduce the large amount
of data storage is to apply a lossy compression
method (Aiazzi et al., 2006; Mielikainen and Toivanen,
2006). “Lossy”, means that, once the input image has
been encoded and later decoded, the recovered image is
not exactly the same as the original input image, but some
information has been removed. Although some specific
applications do not allow any kind of information re-
moval, some information losses are allowed in many other
situations. However, the noise introduced by the lossy
compression process must be kept below a given thresh-
old to avoid damaging relevant information.
2.2 Lossy compression of remote sensing
images
Lossy compression methods remove information which
is not significant for image reconstruction. This is the
key issue in lossy image compression, because the in-
formation removed should depend on the user purposes.
Several criteria for image quality can be defined, as de-
scribed in Cristophe et al. (2005), depending on the de-
sired goal. Preliminary experiments (Minguillo´n et al.,
2000a,b) show that it is possible to achieve relatively high
compression ratios without removing critical information.
Figure 3 shows a simplified block diagram of the com-
ponents of the encoder in a typical lossy compression
system. It mainly consists of five basic stages. In fact,
most systems include a pre-processing stage (P) where, if
needed, a colour model conversion or a dimension reduc-
tion is performed. Then, firstly, a transform (T) is applied
to the input data in order to obtain de-correlated coeffi-
cients and a higher compactness of energy in a few coef-
ficients. Secondly, a quantization stage (Q) removes in-
formation considered unnecessary for the user purposes.
Thirdly, a bit plane encoding (BPE) is applied to account
for the significance of the quantized coefficients. Finally,
an entropy coding scheme (EC) is used to reduce the
amount of bits needed to send the significant quantized
coefficients through the transmission channel. At the re-
ceiver side, the decoder performs the inverse operations
in reverse order. The overall goal is to produce a recov-
ered image as close as possible to the original image I
while preserving the bit rate needed to transmit I∗ as low
as possible, maximizing a quality criterion.
The general coding scheme must be adapted to the par-
ticular characteristics of the source, in order to maximize
both the compression ratio and the image fidelity. In this
case, the most important issue is that the remote sensing
images are 3D, where two dimensions are spatial but the
third one is spectral. An ideal compression method would
take advantage of this fact, trying to exploit both spatial
and spectral redundancy. Coding each band separately is
suboptimal as spectral redundancy is not exploited, while
applying 3D coding schemes does not take into account
the difference between spatial and spectral dimensions.
Several authors have proposed 3D transformations to de-
correlate spatial and spectral redundancy. For example,
Motta et al. (2005) present a survey on hyperspectral im-
age compression. In this paper, vector quantization is
used for lossy compression, and all bands are processed
at the same time.
2.3 Vector Quantization and Tree Structure
Vector Quantization
Vector Quantization (VQ), as described in Gersho and
Gray (1992), makes it possible to compress an image
in an optimal manner from the Shannon’s rate-distortion
theory point of view. As detailed in (Gersho and Gray,
1992; Gray and Neuhoff, 1998), Shannon (1948) showed
that, given a coding rate, the least distortion achievable
by vector quantisers of any kind is equal to a function,
subsequently called the Shannon distortion-rate function,
which is determined by the statistics of the source and
the measure of distortion. Shannon’s rate-distortion the-
ory establishes the minimal amount of information which
must be communicated over a channel so that the source
can be approximately reconstructed at the receiver with-
out exceeding a given distortion. Thus, applying VQ com-
pression systems, the resulting image minimizes (locally)
distortion for a given compression ratio. However, VQ
compression can be computationally prohibitive. Hence
alternative methods known to be suboptimal need to be
explored for practical applications.
Tree Structured Vector Quantizer (TSVQ) is a subopti-
mal strategy which works starting with an initial centroid
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as the codebook, that is, a tree with a single leaf, and then
a quality criterion is applied (Mean Square Error). If there
is room for improvement, the leaf with higher distortion is
split into two similar centroids, and then the Linde-Buzo-
Gray algorithm, described in (Linde et al., 1980), is ap-
plied for computing the new centroids. This process is re-
peated until a general quality criterion is achieved or when
all leaves contain only equal samples within the same leaf,
meaning that a perfect tree T has been built . For large
images, when the number of training vectors is also large,
the resulting tree is usually quite deep, although it might
be very unbalanced. Nevertheless, the number of possi-
ble subtrees is large enough to explore the possibilities of
finding feasible subtrees for watermark embedding.
Finally, the original image is coded using the selected
subtree, replacing each original vector by the closest cen-
troid, that is, by the centroid representing all the elements
in the leaf where the original vector falls. This selection
is performed starting from the root of the tree, and choos-
ing the closest centroid until a leaf is reached. Unlike the
generation of the initial tree T , coding the tree selected
is a very fast operation which can be performed very effi-
ciently.
3 Multiple band watermarking
scheme
The watermarking scheme presented in this paper is de-
scribed in the following sections. In Subsection 3.1, the
lossy compression and watermarking are described, while
Subsection 3.2 shows how to detect tampered marked im-
ages.
3.1 Mark embedding process
Let’s consider an original three dimensional hyperspec-
tral image I of size M × N × b, where b stands for the
number of bands. This paper uses AVIRIS images, but the
same method can be applied to any kind of multi, hyper
or ultraspectral images.
Pre-processing step
An optional pre-processing step of the watermarking
scheme suggested here is to compress and decompress the
original image with JPEG2000 (Taubman and Marcellin,
2002), e.g.using the KaKaDu software (Taubman, 2007)
with 14 bits per pixel (bpp) as compression parameter, in
such a way that the noise of remote sensing image sen-
sors is removed and the less significant information of the
signature is also removed. If this pre-processing step is
applied, the robustness of the scheme is increased, but the
Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) of the marked image
decreases. Nevertheless, this step helps reduce the noise
of the sensors and any potential spurious values in the data
are removed.
Band selection, LSB extract and block division
For hyperspectral and ultraspectral images, with a large
number of bands and a huge number of pixels, we propose
to group bands according to a reordering criterion, creat-
ing different spectral signatures which will be processed
separately, or to select a set of bands with a significant
information to be precessed, following the recommenda-
tions given by Gersho and Gray (1992). In this paper,
several hyperspectral images have been chosen to test the
scheme. The experiments have been performed for set of
bands (16 bands selected out of 224) of AVIRIS images.
The selected bands are equally spaced in the wavelength
axis.
After band selection, the resulting image has 16 values
(one for each band) of 2 bytes per pixel. To increase the
robustness of the process against compression attacks, the
n least significant bits (LSB) of each pixels are removed
(and will be restored afterwards). The larger the num-
ber n of extracted LSB, the more robust the watermark-
ing scheme will become. Increasing the number of LSB
increases the robustness, but decreases the quality of the
marked image. However, the number of extracted LSB
must limited such that each value has enough informa-
tion to build TSVQ trees as detailed below. Nevertheless,
these LSB are kept to generate the final marked image, in
such a way that the final marked image has 16 × 2 bytes
(in this case, 16 is the number of bands) by pixel. The
LSB recovery process is detailed below.
Finally, the image I is segmented in blocksW×H×b′,
where W ≤ M and H ≤ N are the size in pixels of
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each block, and W × H vectors are created by grouping
all pixels and spectral values (bands), and b′ ≤ b is the
number of selected bands. In this paper, we have used
b = 16. This block division makes it possible to detect
specific tampered regions in attacked images.
Block mark embedding
Figure 4 summarizes the selection of the bands, the seg-
mentation of the image in blocks, and the construction of
the TSVQ vectors. For an image of 512×512 pixels, there
are 262 144 signatures with 16 values, one for each band,
which is a reasonably large value for vector quantization
purposes.
The vectors for each block B are replaced by very sim-
ilar values (block)B′ obtained from the leaves of a TSVQ
tree, chosen from a family of trees, with minimal dis-
tortion and enforcing a particular property which will be
checked at the detector side. TSVQ lossy compression is
thus used to generate a similar image (block) B∗. The
relevant steps of the TSVQ process applied here are pre-
processing (P), transform (T) and quantization (Q), as de-
scribed in Section 2.2.
Using the TSVQ algorithm described in Gersho and
Gray (1992), a complete tree of centroids is built, contain-
ing all the possible subtrees for compressing the original
image block. Then, the BFOS algorithm of Breiman et al.
(1984) prunes the generated tree with the selected crite-
rion to obtain all the subtrees in the Compression ratio-
Distortion curve, namely the convex hull. A parameter
of the resulting TSVQ tree determines the subtree that is
required to obtain the specific compression of the image
block, for example the entropy or compression ratio itself
and selects only one subtree from the thousands of possi-
ble subtrees. The BFOS algorithm ensures the best possi-
ble subtree with the lowest compression ratio for the se-
lected criterion, in the optimal ratio-distortion curve gen-
erated by all the optimal subtrees.
As a possible improvement of the proposed method, if
the maximum difference between the original vectors and
the centroid of the leaf where they fall into is known, any
modified version of the centroid between the original vec-
tor and the selected centroid could be used for obtaining a
modified image block.
In order to exploit both spatial and spectral (3D) redun-
dancy, some authors propose to use a Discrete Wavelet
Transform (DWT) on each band and then a vector quanti-
zation step for each new spectral signature using a mul-
tiresolution approach. We have followed a similar ap-
proach, but we use the original pixels, without any trans-
formation (apart from the LSB extraction step), because
we do not try to maximize the compression ratio, but to
obtain similar images for embedding information for wa-
termarking purposes.
The division of the original image into blocks is per-
formed following the recommendations in Raudys (1997),
where it is shown that the ratio between the number of
available samples and vector dimensionality should be at
least 30 in order to minimize any statistical bias caused
by an insufficient number of samples. Therefore, as in
our case the dimension of the signatures is 16 (number of
selected bands), we need at least 16 × 30 different sam-
ples for compression and classification purposes. For this
reason, the regions must have at least 480 samples. If we
use square regions with powers of two sizes, the mini-
mum size of these regions is 32 × 32 (which results in 1
024 samples). We have used regions of 64 × 64 pixels in
order to reduce the number of blocks. Then, the original
512×512 image has been divided into 8×8 small regions,
and these 64 small regions are marked separately.
At this point, it is important to note that the mark of
each block is determined by the criterion selected in each
block. However, the compression ratio does not take
into account the individual bands but the signatures as a
whole, since we are using a vector quantization approach.
Hence, this proposal is different from other semi-fragile
watermarking methods in the literature (Rey and Dugelay,
2002; Ekici et al., 2004) which process each band sepa-
rately.
As manipulations to the marked image are concerned, a
large modification in any single band or small number of
bands is considered unacceptable in remote sensing im-
ages, because these attacks introduce an uneven change
in the spectral signature. Only modifications affecting the
whole signature are accepted, such as lossy compression,
but only up to a certain degree.
In Table 1, an example of the different subtrees gen-
erated during the pruning algorithm is described. The
columns of this table represent the ratio between the dis-
tortion and the compression ratio (λ), the compression ra-
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tio, the distortion, the maximum and minimum depth of
the subtree, the number of nodes of the subtree and the
entropy of the subtree. All these values are given for each
possible subtree which can be generated by pruning the
original one (denoted by index 0). These measures are
used as the basic criterion for stopping the pruning algo-
rithm and determining the specific subtree which will be
used in the marked image block. A simple but efficient
criterion is to stop when the maximum depth achieves a
desired value. Even with simple criteria like this, it is pos-
sible to generate complex subtrees which are impossible
to reproduce by manipulating the original image. Table 1
shows an example of the subtree process selection by a
entropy criterion. In this case, the criterion is 8.64 and the
subtree 805 is selected.
Each block of the original image is compressed with
a different compression ratio, according to the selected
criterion. This new block is processed with the TSVQ
process again, using the same parameters as in the first
iteration, and this process is repeated until the generated
block has the desired properties.
The secret key is used in this point, since a different cri-
terion is selected for a each block of 64×64 pixels. To de-
tect possible tampering attacks, such as copy-and-replace,
or pasting one part of another image into the marked im-
age, a pseudo-random sequence is chosen to determine the
values used as criteria to select the compression subtree in
the pruning algorithm. Thus, it is much more difficult to
find a pattern revealing the watermarking scheme proper-
ties, thus reducing the possibilities of manipulating an im-
age or modifying it using another region of the same im-
age. A key is required to watermark images, which is used
to generate the pseudo-random sequence. Hence, each
block of the marked image has a different mark (prop-
erty), to allow forensic process over the marked image.
This key is the seed of a Pseudo-Random Number Gen-
erator (PRNG) and will be required in the detection pro-
cess. Nevertheless, the proposed method does not need
the original image for tampering detection, thus it can be
considered blind.
The entropy of the tree is used to select which tree
is used to build the marked block. For each block, the
pseudo-random sequence determines the entropy of the
compression tree. However, not all the values of entropy
are possible, but only a set of these values are chosen (the
entropy is quantized).
Finally, the BFOS algorithm generates a table with all
the possible subtrees which are in the convex hull, mini-
mizing distortion for a given compression ratio. Usually,
both compression ratio and MSE are used for generating
the convex hull, but the BFOS algorithm may be used with
any other criteria which might be more suitable for wa-
termarking purposes or for joint compression and water-
marking as detailed in Caldelli et al. (2004).
Once it is determined which subtree is used to gener-
ate the modified block, the resulting watermarked block
is constructed with the centroids of the selected subtree
which represents the embedded mark.
The number (n) of LSB bits that are extracted from
the original image is a parameter of the scheme which
determines the robustness of the marked image against
compression attacks. Therefore, a simple compression of
marked image is accepted, because a small ratio compres-
sion modifies only a few LSB of signature vectors. The
n LSB bits of the marked pixels are restored as follows
(Figure 5):
1. If the new value of the pixel is lower than the un-
marked value, the LSB are filled with ones.
2. If the new value of the pixel is greater than the un-
marked value, the LSB are filled with zeroes.
3. If the new value of the pixel is identical to that of
the unmarked value, the LSB are restored from the
original pixel.
Let LSB′ be the new value of the LSB bits. The restored
bits are computed using equation 1:
LSB′ =

1s : B∗n,m,b < Bn,m,b
0s : B∗n,m,b > Bn,m,b
LSB : B∗n,m,b = Bn,m,b
(1)
Summary
The following steps (see Figure 6) summarize the mark
embedding process:
0. Pre-processing: compression and decompression the
original image with JPEG2000 (KaKaDu Software).
1. Band selection and block construction of the image
to be marked (as shown in Figure 4).
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2. Extract n LSB for each pixel component.
3. Choose the seed of Pseudo-Random Number Gener-
ator (PRNG) and initialize it.
4. Choose the mark property (e.g. entropy).
5. For all blocks
5.1 Generate a number with the PRNG and check
it is not repeated for a previous block.
5.2 Choose the entropy according to the number
generated in step 5.1.
5.3 Select the tree with entropy value chosen in
step 5.2 (see Table 1).
5.4 Generate the image using the tree obtained in
step 5.3.
5.5 Check the property selected in 5.2. If not
checked go to 5.3 with the image generated in
5.4.
5.6 Restore the LSB extracted in 2 minimizing the
difference of the pixel values.
6. Join all the blocks (and the bands not selected in step
1) to build the final marked image.
3.2 Forgery detection
The mark detection process for a (possibly forged) im-
age, shown in Figure 7, is analogous to the mark embed-
ding process, and it only requires the seed of the pseudo-
random sequence. First of all, the same bands used for
embedding must be extracted from the marked image.
Then, it must be divided into the same blocks to deter-
mine if the mark is present or if they have been modified
(above a given threshold). As detailed in the figure, the
LSB must be extracted from the (assumed) marked block.
For each block and the corresponding property for that
block (computed from the PRNG), the detection process
is performed.
The detection of a modification of the image can be per-
formed by checking if the same criterion used in the mark
embedding scheme is satisfied. Thus, the TSVQ tree is
constructed for each block and the criterion is checked.
If the block verifies the criterion then the area is assumed
to be authenticated. Otherwise, the block is detected as
forged. Therefore, with this method it is possible to in-
spect and locate tampered regions in a marked image.
4 Experimental Results and Com-
parative Analysis
This section presents the results obtained with the method
described above and also compares the suggested scheme
with other watermarking schemes in the literature.
4.1 Experimental Results
As described in section 3.1, a hyperspectral AVIRIS im-
age (Figure 8) has been used to evaluate our detection sys-
tem for tampered images. For evaluation purposes, we
measure the influence of the embedding process on im-
age quality and an example of the positive detection of a
copy-and-replace attack is shown.
The chosen image is that of a cuprite area of Nevada.
This image contains relevant information about minerals
which is essential to protect against malicious tamper-
ing attacks. In a cuprite area, there are different min-
erals with different reflectance which will lead to differ-
ent economical profits. Because of this, a potential buyer
of the hyperspectral image, needs too be confident about
the authenticity and integrity of the image in case he or
she wants to obtain economical benefits by exploiting the
corresponding area. This image has been taken from a
12 280 metres × 40 960 metres area. Although the sug-
gested scheme can be applied to any image size, we have
selected a 512× 512 pixel image size, which represents a
square-shaped area of 10 240 metres of width and height.
This area is then divided into 8× 8 blocks and each block
contains 64×64 pixels (representing 1 280×1 280 square
metres of the area). Each pixel is represented by a 2-byte
(16-bit) integer. However, the two Most Significant Bits
(MSB) are always zero. Hence, it can be considered that
the pixels are actually represented by 14 bits.
The AVIRIS image of this cuprite zone has 224 differ-
ent bands. A subset of 16 bands has been chosen to embed
the mark. The subset of bands can be selected accord-
ing to different criteria, such as random selection, equally
spaced bands in the frequency axis, atmospheric criteria
(reflectance is different at difference frequencies due to
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atmospheric reasons) or materials of the image area (some
frequencies provide better light reflectance for some ma-
terials). In this experiment, for simplicity, 16 equally
spaced values in the frequency axis have been chosen. We
have selected 1 out of each group of 16 bands in the orig-
inal hyperspectral image. In particular, the selected bands
are the following: 4, 18, 32, 46, 60, 74, 88, 102, 116, 130,
144, 151, 172, 186, 200 and 215. The 158 and 214 bands
have some errors in the values read by the sensor (e.g. the
band 158 has all values assigned to zero). Because of this,
the 151 and 215 bands have been chosen instead. Figure 8
shows a greyscale bitmap corresponding to three of these
selected bands.
In a first experiment, we have used n = 2, i.e. the 2
LSB of the original image have been extracted and they
were replaced later on by the value which minimizes the
distance from the original image to the marked one. This
LSB-removal process produces robustness against a com-
pression attack (such as a JPEG or a JPEG2000 coder).
The mark embedding process affects the image qual-
ity of the signature of the image of the selected bands.
The PSNR is a measure of distortion commonly given in
decibels (dB), using a logarithmic scale for the results.
The PSNR of the marked hyperspectral image computed
for all the 224 bands is 77.336 (dB), and the percent-
age of modified pixels is 0.96% (only 563 502 out of the
58 720 256 pixels are modified by the embedding pro-
cess). The PSNR (equation 2) is calculated with the max-
imum value of pixel image. For this particular image, the
maximum value is 12 500, therefore the PSNR has been
calculated with the value 214 − 1 = 16 383 instead of
65 535.
PSNR = 10 · log10
(
MAX2
MSE
)
= 10 · log10
(
16 3832
MSE
)
(2)
The PSNR for each of the modified bands is shown in
Table 2, where “PMP” stands for “Percentage of Modi-
fied Pixels” and “Adi” stands for “Average difference” of
the modified pixels. Notice that PSNR is quite high, spe-
cially for central bands containing more information, and
it is slightly worse for the last few bands, although the ob-
tained values are still reasonable. On average, the PSNR
for the different modified bands is 66.257 dB. The num-
ber of modified pixels is very small, only 13.43% of the
262 144 pixels per modified band are changed with an av-
erage difference of 16.84 (where the range of pixel values
is from 1 200 to 12 500).
The distribution of the error introduced in the embed-
ding process is shown in Figure 9 only for the modified
pixels (note that 99% of the pixels are not modified). As
reported above, the average of the absolute value of the er-
ror (difference between the original and the marked pixel)
for the modified pixels is 16.84. Although the differences
are always integer numbers, note that the average of the
absolute values of these differences, computed for all the
modified pixels, is a rational number.
The difference between the original signature (for one
pixel) and the marked signature is shown in Figure 10.
The marked signature is shifted 200 units down only to
show the difference between the two signatures. The fig-
ure shows that the two signatures are almost identical.
Hence the classification methods work identically either
with the original or the marked signature, since the mod-
ification only affects 0.96% of the pixels with a average
difference of 16.84. In this figure, we have taken into ac-
count the errors due to the data acquisition. For instance,
the original image has some zero or 65 535 values due to
sensor errors. These values have been removed to show
the correct curves of the original and marked signatures.
As shown in Table 3, the number of removed LSB af-
fects the difference between the pixels values after mark
embedding. This table shows, from left to right, the image
used in the experiment, the number of removed LSB, the
PSNR of the marked bands, the PSNR of the whole im-
age, the average of the differences (in absolute value) of
the modified pixels (the original value minus the marked
value), the average deviation of these differences and the
number of modified pixels. The PSNR results for the
Cuprite image for n = 2, 3 and 4 are given in the first
few rows. It can be seen that, by removing 4 LSB (n = 4)
the PSNR increases, on average, to 67.58 dB, but the av-
erage difference raises up to 17.20 instead of 16.84 (the
average difference for n = 2). This is because the mark
embedding scheme affects the bits from the 5th LSB to
the MSB if 4 LSB are removed, leading to better robust-
ness against compression but increasing the difference be-
tween the modified and the original pixels.
Note that the PSNR increases when the n (the number
of removed LSB) increases. The reason for this behaviour
is that the TSVQ procedure modifies less pixels when n
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increases: with n = 2 the scheme modifies 0.96% of all
pixels, but with n = 4 it modifies only 0.71%. Increasing
n reduces the number of significant bits used for build-
ing the vectors and reverts on smaller TSVQ trees and,
thus, the TSVQ procedure modifies a smaller amount of
pixels leading to an increased PSNR (which is counter-
intuitive). However, the larger n is, the larger the dif-
ference between the original pixel value and the marked
value becomes. The difference is small on average, but in
a particular band it can increase to 25.32. The number of
significant bits (16 − n) can not be reduced indefinitely,
since the number of vector values would not be enough to
build the classification trees.
As discussed in Section 1, semi-fragile watermarking
schemes make it possible to produce compressed ver-
sions of the image preserving the embedded information.
These versions can be distributed electronically at differ-
ent prices according to the degree of quality, and the buyer
can still determine the authenticity of the marked image.
For this reason, the robustness of the scheme has been
measured against compression attacks. Compression at-
tacks are defined as a JPEG2000 compression and de-
compression process, for 3:1 and 2:1 compression ratios.
These attacks are supported and do not affect the mark
embedded in the image (for n = 2). Higher compression
ratios can remove the mark but also remove some relevant
information of the images. This establishes a trade-off be-
tween quality and robustness (or fragility). If larger com-
pression ratios are required, n can be increased (to 3 or 4,
for example).
The PSNR results given above have been obtained for
the Cuprite image with 14 bpp, and hence the PSNR is
obtained by dividing
(
214 − 1)2 = 16 3832 by the MSE.
Other methods use images with 8 bpp and thus, their
PSNR results are obtaining by dividing
(
28 − 1)2 = 2552
by the MSE. In principle, the PSNR could be greater with
14 bpp than with 8 bpp. In order to overcome this draw-
back, a set of experiments have been carried out with dif-
ferent images:
• The Cuprite image reduced to 8 bpp (the 6 LSB have
been suppressed).
• The Indian Pines AVIRIS image, which is commonly
used in other papers, like Sal and Gran˜a (2008), with
14 bpp (two bytes per pixel, but the two most signif-
icant bits are always 0).
• The Indian Pines image reduced to 8 bpp.
For the 8 bpp images, the values of n are 0, 1 and 2.
Larger values are not advisable since that would mean re-
moving 3 or more LSB out of only 8.
The PSNR results obtained for these images are also
shown in Table 3. As expected, the PSNR for 8 bpp im-
ages is a bit lower than that obtained with 14 bpp images.
With 8 bpp, the PSNR is around 60 dB for the marked
bands and 70 dB for the whole image. For 14 bpp, the
results are around 70 dB for the marked bands and 80 dB
for the whole image. It can be noticed that the results are
remarkably similar between the two chosen images when
the number of bpp is the same.
Table 4 shows some compression attacks and the ro-
bustness of the scheme for different values of n (for the
Cuprite image with 14 bpp). This table provides the av-
erage and the maximum difference for the pixel values
between the attacked file and the marked one. Note that
the scheme allows some compression ratio. In general,
the parameter n determines the robustness of the scheme,
since pixel deviations up to 2n − 1 will be allowed. With
n = 2, the compression is only permitted to 8 bpp (the
original image has 16 bpp) since the maximum difference
in the pixel values is 3 = 22 − 1. With n = 3 and
n = 4, the compression is allowed up to 7 and 6 bpp
respectively, since they allow deviations of up to 7 and
15 in the pixel values (also respectively). This example
illustrates how the parameter n can be used to tune the
robustness/fragility trade-off of the suggested method.
Finally, a random block selection and replacement into
the image has been performed into the marked image.
All the copy-and-replace attacks have been detected by
the scheme. Figure 11 shows the original image and the
marked image with one specific key and n = 2. Notice
that no artifacts are visually detectable. On the other hand,
Figure 12 shows a tampered image and the tamper loca-
tion as detected by the proposed scheme. In this image, it
is possible to see a forest region which has been copied
and replaced into a mineral region, next to the forest.
This forgery has been perfectly detected by the suggested
scheme. In addition, no false positive forgeries have been
detected in the performed experiments.
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4.2 Comparative analysis with other water-
marking schemes
This Section presents a comparison between the sug-
gested scheme and other watermarking systems for re-
mote sensing images. Some previous works have been
selected and compared with the proposed method. All
of them are blind–except Tamhankar et al. (2003)–, semi-
fragile and allow some level of compression. The selected
method can be used for tampering detection, but not all of
them report the tamper localization.
Table 5 shows the results obtained with each method.
In the first column, the chosen method is referenced. The
second column shows the type of the remote sensing im-
age used in the corresponding method. The third col-
umn describes whether the method is applied to a single
band, a subset of bands or the whole signature. The fourth
column reports the PSNR obtained with each method (if
available). Finally, the fifth column indicates whether the
method can be used for tamper localization, reporting ei-
ther the size of the identified tampered area or “No” if it
can applied only for tamper detection (not localization).
It can be noticed that the proposed scheme provides
tamper localization, works with the whole signature and
yields extremely high image quality, since the PSNR over-
comes that of the other schemes: around 70 dB for 8 bpp
images against 55 dB for the best of the other schemes.
Even if we consider the PSNR only of the 16 marked
bands, the proposed scheme yields PSNR around 60 dB,
still better than that of the other schemes. The different
methods have not been tested for exactly the same images
for several reasons: some of them do not provide exact
values for the tuning parameters, some work for different
types of images (RGB against hyperspectral), some use
sophisticated techniques like genetic algorithms which re-
quire expertise in order to implement them, etc. However,
the results given in Table 3 show that the proposed scheme
yields similar PSNR for different images (as far as the
number of bpp is the same). Thus, the comparison for 8
bpp images provided in Table 5 is fair enough.
Among the methods which are applied to hyperspec-
tral images, note that Sal and Gran˜a (2008) is applied to
each band separately, which means that the signature is
not modified evenly and the curve can be significantly al-
tered. The scheme described by Sal and Gran˜a (2008) can
be used to detect tampering, but not the localization of
manipulated signatures. Finally, although the scheme of
Tamhankar et al. (2003) works with the whole signature
of a set of pixels, it does not provide information about
tamper localization either. As the size of the tampering lo-
calization is concerned, (Qin et al., 2004; Ho et al., 2005;
Caldelli et al., 2006) make it possible to identify smaller
tampered areas compared to the proposed scheme, but
those methods must be applied to each separate band and
yield worse PSNR results.
5 Conclusions
In this work, a semi-fragile watermarking method for
multi and hyperspectral data based on tree structured
vector quantization and compression is presented. The
method uses the information in all the bands at the same
time, and thus, it takes advantage of both spatial and spec-
tral redundancy for marking purposes. Basically, the orig-
inal image is segmented in three dimensional blocks and a
tree structured vector quantizer is built for each block to-
gether with a LSB extracting process. The original block
is replaced by a new one generated by substituting each
original vector by the closest centroid in the selected sub-
tree. This process is repeated until a certain stopping cri-
terion is satisfied. Each block generates a different subtree
and a secret key is used to avoid copy-and-replace attacks
between blocks.
The results show that copy-and-replace attack of a
region of the image is detected by the watermarking
scheme, whereas near-lossless (JPEG2000 or JPEG) com-
pression can be applied up to ratios 3:1 preserving the
mark in the compressed image. The detection process is
a simple one, since a tree is built for each block and the
selected tree property is tested. If a block satisfies such a
property, then it has not been forged, otherwise the detec-
tion process reports tampering.
An operational setting of the method described in this
paper would be as follows. An image distributor wants
the hyperspectral image of a given area and contacts an
image provider (e.g. a space agency) to buy it. The im-
age provider would obtain the hyperspectral image, apply
the embedding process described in Section 3.1 (with spe-
cific keys chosen for the image and/or the distributor) and
provide the distributor with the requested image and the
key. In addition, the image provider will also offer the
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mark detection software for any interested party. The dis-
tributor can offer (re-sell) different compressed versions
of the image to different buyers. Apart from the marked
image and the secret key, the buyers would request the
image provider for the mark detection software to check
the authenticity of the image. The buyers would feed the
software with the purchased image and the secret key. The
mark detection software would be the same for all images,
distributors and buyers (with the only possible change of
the secret key) and it would report if the image has been
forged and, if it is the case, the tamper locations. Hence,
once validated, the buyers can be confident about of the
authenticity of the image.
Future research lines in this subject include the study
of optimal subtree selection criteria for pruning purposes,
in order to reduce the size of the blocks and, at the same
time, to detect the most likely modified pixels instead of
complete blocks, increasing the resolution of tampering
detection. A further evaluation of the proposed scheme
for assessing robustness-fragility, capacity and the impact
on classification accuracy is under study.
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Table 1: Example of the values obtained with the BFOS algorithm.
Subtree λ Compression Distortion Num. Min Max Entropyrate nodes depth depth
0 0.222 13.303 0.0000 6 813 6 24 11.651
1 0.666 13.302 0.0002 6 811 6 24 11.649
2 0.666 13.301 0.0006 6 809 6 24 11.649
3 0.833 13.301 0.0011 6 807 6 24 11.648
4 0.889 13.300 0.0019 6 805 6 24 11.647
5 1.000 13.299 0.0026 6 803 6 24 11.647
6 1.000 13.298 0.0035 6 801 6 24 11.645
7 1.111 13.296 0.0055 6 791 6 24 11.644
8 1.250 13.295 0.0063 6 789 6 24 11.643
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
805 10.000 9.5067 19.6232 2 867 6 17 8.640
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
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Table 2: PSNR of the marked image for each band.
Band PSNR PMP Adi Band PSNR PMP Adi
1 64.309 13.368 20.458 9 62.369 13.969 25.416
2 67.034 13.176 14.515 10 68.115 13.258 13.609
3 67.411 13.304 14.357 11 67.917 13.319 13.911
4 67.468 13.338 14.402 12 64.765 13.725 19.781
5 68.072 13.225 13.353 13 65.730 13.641 17.656
6 68.531 12.124 12.735 14 65.294 13.575 18.031
7 68.359 13.166 13.039 15 65.201 13.569 18.773
8 67.448 13.329 14.452 16 63.087 13.871 23.596
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Table 3: PSNR values for different images and different values of n.
Image n PSNR (dB) PSNR (dB) Adi Diff. dev. NMPMarked bands Whole image
Cuprite
(14 bpp)
2 66.25 77.34 16.84 16.83 0.96%
3 66.50 77.57 17.07 15.70 0.87%
4 67.58 78.42 17.20 15.72 0.71%
Cuprite
(8 bpp)
0 58.74 69.93 1.14 0.39 0.46%
1 58.22 69.17 1.26 0.52 0.42%
2 61.06 71.56 1.43 0.76 0.17%
Indian Pines
(14 bpp)
2 70.87 79.43 11.13 12.14 1.12%
3 71.88 80.03 11.65 12.55 0.91%
4 73.22 80.92 13.01 13.17 0.63%
Indian Pines
(8 bpp)
0 60.38 70.22 1.12 0.36 0.45%
1 60.97 69.70 1.30 0.52 0.35%
2 65.25 72.38 1.53 0.84 0.12%
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Table 4: Robustness of the scheme against compression attacks
n Compression Mark Average Max. NMPbits (bpp) survival difference difference
2
8 yes 1.14 3 48.91%
7 no 1.65 7 70.49%
6 no 2.41 13 83.84%
3
8 yes 1.15 3 49.29%
7 yes 1.47 7 70.59%
6 no 2.43 12 84.01%
5 no 4.13 19 91.73%
4
8 yes 1.12 3 50.23%
7 yes 1.57 7 72.07%
6 yes 2.42 14 81.13%
5 no 4.19 26 91.33%
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Table 5: Comparison of the proposed scheme with other watermarking systems.
Scheme
Image Embedding
PSNR
Tamper
type strategy localization
Caldelli et al. (2006)
Greyscale
1 band ≤ 45 dB (8 bpp) 16× 8
(1 band) blocks
Ho et al. (2005)
Greyscale
1 band ∼ 40 dB (8 bpp) 8× 8
(1 band) blocks
Qin et al. (2004) RGB RGB
Not ∼ Tampered
reported area
Wang et al. (2005)
Panchromatic
1 band ∼ 55 dB (8 bpp) No
(1 band)
Sal and Gran˜a (2008) Hyperspectral Band by band
Not
No
reported
Tamhankar et al. (2003) Hyperspectral
Selected Not
No
signatures reported
Proposed Hyperspectral 16 bands
∼ 80 dB (14 bpp) 64× 64
∼ 70 dB (8 bpp) (or 32× 32)
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Figure 3: Encoder block diagram of a lossy image compression scheme.
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Figure 4: Band selection, block construction and generation of the signature vectors.
22
Figure 5: LSB restore scheme.
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Figure 6: Block diagram of the embedding process.
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Figure 7: Block diagram of the detection process.
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Figure 8: Example of the multispectral image bands 2, 7 and 12.
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Figure 9: Histogram of the embedding distortion for the modified pixels.
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Figure 10: Sample difference of the original and marked (shifted) signatures for a modified pixel.
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Figure 11: Original (top) and marked (bottom) images for band 2.
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Figure 12: Tampered image (top) and tamper location (bottom).
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